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1. Introduction
This paper deals with the variety of uses of the verb HAVE in English,
Dutch and French. In each of these languages, HAVE displays different
usages. However, in English, HAVE has uses not found in the other two
languages. This HAVE we shall refer to as augmented HAVE, a label that
brings out the essential ingredient in the account of the difference between
English HAVE and its Dutch and French congeners.
We defend the following claims:
a. HAVE (both augmented and non-augmented) is “partitive”. 
This partitive nature is determined by one of the elements out of which
HAVE is composed, viz. a reflexive element, represented throughout as SE .
The presence of this element is responsible for the “anaphorization”
requirement imposed on HAVE's complement.
b. The complement of HAVE may be DP or TP.
A DP complement correlates with intrinsic possession. A TP complement
correlates with contingent possession or happenstance. Moreover, TP
complements are a kind of Small Clause, inasmuch as they are not headed
by C°, and hence do not allow morphological Tense. We examine the full
range of possibilities for the complement structure of abstract TNS.
c. Augmented HAVE is the result of incorporating a dynamic P.
In English, the dynamic P is to. Lack of such an augment in Dutch and
French accounts for the unavailability of the interpretations involving
augmented HAVE.1
2. Non-dynamic possessive structures.
2.1. Inherent and non-inherent possession
All HAVE-languages appear to feature two distinct types of stative
possessive structures: alienable and inalienable. Simple alienable possessive
structures are restricted to animate subjects (Belvin 1993), yielding the
                                                
1 The incorporation of this augment is not responsible for the creation
of HAVE as a form, as one might think on the basis of Kayne's proposal. Rather,
the form of HAVE is unaffected by this incorporation, just like the form of GIVE
is unaffected under the incorporation of the same augment in double object
constructions. However, we do not deny that the form HAVE may result from an
incorporation of an oblique element into BE (which we take to be our SE,
following Postma 1993). This oblique element is not the dynamic to , but rather a
stative preposition.
contrast between (2a) and (2b):
(1) a. the table has four legs inherent
b. John has a big nose inherent
(2) a. *the table has a lamp contingent
b. John has $5 contingent
This animacy effect disappears in the case of complex complements as in
(3c), which we propose to analyze as small clauses (SC).
(3) a. the table has a lamp on it contingent
b. John has $5 on him contingent
To preview, we analyze the complement of HAVE in (1) as a DP, and the
one in (3) as a Small Clause (specifically, as a TP complement with null
Tense). We argue that the well-formedness of (2b) reflects the (independently
motivated) availability of animate pro.
The patterning of the inalienable possessor structures in (1)-(3) establishes
that, in certain environments, there is an animacy effect. One way to capture
this effect, more or less in the terms of Belvin (1993), is to say that
inalienable possession is inherently internal, but that alienable possession is
external and so must be “internalized” via an anaphoric relation with some
element contained in the complement of HAVE, cf. the pronouns it and him
in (3). Granting this, two questions arise:
a. What is the source of the “internality” requirement?
b. In the absence of an overt anaphoric relation, as in (1) and
(2b), how is the “internality” requirement satisfied?
In order to answer the first question we follow the hypothesis of Kayne
(1992) and others by assuming that HAVE results from the incorporation of
an oblique element into BE. We also follow Postma (1993) who identifies
BE as a SE-morpheme.2 We therefore assume the following underlying
structure and derivation:
(4) DPi <nom> SE XP P ti
                                                
2 As is clear from the structure in (4), we slightly depart from Kayne with
respect to the site from which the oblique head is incorporated: while in Kayne's
proposal, the Dative phrase originates internal to a DP complement of BE, we
position it external to this complement.
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SE+P=HAVE
Relevant to us is the SE-part in HAVE: its anaphoric nature gives an
immediate account of the partitive relationship that exists between the
subject of HAVE and its complement, as it would for the same partitive
relationship that holds for BE-constructions (John is ill means that being ill
is among John's properties, just as John has a big nose means that the nose
is a part of John). The difference between HAVE and BE resides in the
availability of accusative Case in HAVE constructions, which requires a
Case-dependent DP in the complement. Hoekstra (1993) argues that HAVE
inherits its Case-licensing potential from the incorporated P.
This analysis of SE  is fairly close to Kayne's (class lectures) analysis of a
simple reflexive SE-construction such as Jean se voit  ‘John SELF-sees’, as
in (5):
(5) Jeani SEj voitk [VP PROj tk ti] i=j
where Jean is moved from the object position, SE  is base-generated in some
functional head-position. The external argument is PRO. SE  is linked to
PRO for the same reason as in (6), i.e. in order to be licit vis-à-vis the
principle of Full Interpretation (FI). The i=j identity comes about through
the manner of head-spec agreement in a way which need not concern us at
this point.
The SE-component of HAVE-sentences can be thought of as a partitive
operator: it is bound by the subject, but in order to have an interpretation, it
must bind a variable in its scope, as required by FI. This analysis thus
automatically yields the “internality” requirement, as is clear from (6), where
SE must bind a pronoun inside XP.
(6) DPi P+SEi [XP --- proi --- ]
The operator status of SE  is confirmed by examples such as (7), where it
binds two pronominal variables at the same time:
(7) a. John has his hands on his back
b. John has his money in his pocket
We now turn to the question b., viz. how the “internality” requirement is
satisfied. The first step is to recognize that, in principle, a pronominal
variable may arise in a number of different ways. The second step is to
distinguish simple DP complements from Small Clause complements, each
associated with a distinct interpretive effect:
(8) a. HAVE DP permanent/ inherent
b. HAVE [SC DP  PRED] happenstance/ contingent
In (8a), we are dealing with inalienable possession. The binding requirement
is satisfied by an argument of the noun heading the DP. This explains why
only relational nouns occur in this position. The binding of an argument
position in the NP represents the inherent possession, as in (9):
(9) John P+SEi [DP ____ a [NP pro nose proi ]
<1,2>
A body part such as nose is a relational noun:3 besides its R-argument in
the sense of Williams (1981), there is an experiencer argument, represented
by proi in (9), which acts as a variable bound by SE . We are not concerned
at this point with the precise internal structure of DP, but the case in (9)
may be entirely identical to (5), if the experiencer argument is moved to
[Spec,DP], i.e. to the position of John in John's nose. The actual structure
of (9) hence is as in (10). We return to the relevance of this below. The
moved Experiencer proi now has the status of PRO. We follow Kayne
(1991) in the assumption that PRO is a locally bound pronoun. PRO is
licit in the given configuration because of the absence of specified D/AGR,
                                                
3 The property of being a relational noun is context-dependent, but
nevertheless syntactically represented. Obviously, some nouns will always be
relational, e.g. fold  or part. Others vacillate. A clear example is child , which can
be used relationally, or, when in opposition to adult, as non-relational. Other
cases are more subtle. Running water is non-relational in mountaneous areas, but
clearly relational in hotel rooms, where it is dependent on an infrastructure.
Hence, it is possible to say This room has running water, where we are bound to
say that running water is relational. Yet a further example might be dog, which is
part of the larger family where the dog is domesticized, but a non-relational
concept in contexts where dogs, on a par with game, are considered edible. This
context-dependency does not take away the syntactic relevance of the
distinction. Consider the examples in (i):
(i) a. Sandy has a child
b. Sandy has a child on her/his lap
While child  in (ia) is necessarily relational (i.e. there is a child/parent relation),
this is not required in (ib), where the child may or may not be Sandy's. Another
example of the relevance of context is given in (ii):
(ii) a. *This table has a lamp
b. This table has no lamp
Clearly, (iib) is used in a context in which having a lamp is the expected case for
tables: hence, in the given context lamp  has become relational. (iia) is therefore
ungrammatical only under the context in which having a lamp is not the
expected case.
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parallel to the conditions in infinitival clauses.
(10) John P+SEi [DP PROi a [NP pro nose   ti ]
<1,2>
Turning now to the Small Clause structure in (8b): it involves a
predication, and hence denotes an eventuality, i.e. a state of affairs which is
temporally limited. We represent such small clauses not just as projections
of lexical categories, but claim that they contain independent functional
superstructure, in particular an abstract tense-position (Déchaine 1993). It
should be noted that the happenstance or contingent character of these
clausal complements is independent of the nature of possession. This is
evident from the examples in (7), where (7a) involves two inherently
possessed body parts and (7b) involves two non-inherently possessed
entities, but in either case the happenstance interpretation arises.
Specifically, in (7a), the particular relationship between John's hands and
John's back is not inherent, but temporally limited. If it were not, then it
would denote a state of affairs where John always has his hands on his back.
We now have established how the “internality” requirement is satisfied in
cases of inherent possession (via a PRO experiencer), and SC complements
(via overt pronouns). Yet to be accounted for is (2b), an instance of
non-inherent (contingent) possession, but without an overt pronoun. We
now turn to this problem.
2.2. The animacy effect
The ill-formedness of (2a) is predicted by our analysis: lamp is not a
relational noun (cf. note 3). Hence, it does not provide a pronominal
variable for SE  to bind, and the structure is ruled out by FI on account of
SE  having no interpretation.
What is surprising is the well-formedness of (2b): dollar is not a relational
noun, and does not provide a pronominal variable for SE  to bind, leaving
SE  without an appropriate interpretation, violating Full Interpretation. We
conclude that something else must be at play in the licensing of (2b).
Observe that this is an instance of contingent possession. On independent
grounds,we have proposed that contingent possession is to be represented as
TP-complementation. These considerations lead us to postulate the structure
in (11), with a pronominal variable contained in the complement of T.
(11) John P+SEi  [TP  $5j T [SC tj ... proi]]
Simply introducing an empty pronominal is not sufficient to capture the
contrast between (2a) and (2b). We must also ensure that this empty
pronominal does NOT get introduced in (2a). Belvin (1993) notes that such
cases of what he calls “external possession” are limited to animate subjects.
Note that an animacy contrast is found elsewhere, as evidenced in (12)-(13):
(12) a. There is a hat on the table/*John
b. John has a hat on (him)
c. The table has a lamp on *(it)
(13) a. Ik zet een hoed op de tafel/*Jan
I put a hat on the table/John
b. Ik zet Jan/*de tafel een hoed op
I put John/the table a hat on
These examples show that animates in certain environments (precisely the
kinds of environment relevant for these structures) cannot occur in the
complement of P.  Instead, we find an empty complement, e.g. John has a
hat on. This option is excluded in the case of inanimate locations, e.g. *The
table has a lamp on. Let us stipulate, therefore, the presence of an animate
pro in the system, in (13b) bound by the dative DP Jan, and by SE  in (12b).
Going one step further, we now identify the pro postulated in (11)/(2b) with
this animate pro, thus reducing the contrast in (2) to those in (12) and (13).
However, there remains a difference: in (12) and (13) the animate pro occurs
as the complement of an overt P, but in (11)/(2b), no such P is evident. We
propose that the relevant P in (11) is the preposition of “central coincidence”
of Hale (1986). This preposition is distinct from other prepositions in the
language. It is close to the meaning of with  as in John has $5 with him ,
and on as in John has $5 on him , but nevertheless distinct from them. We
take it to be the hyperonym of with  and on.4
The animacy requirement manifests itself in a very subtle manner in the
following contrast:
(14) a. John has his/the window open
b. The house has its/*the window open
The choice of his/its is unproblematic: the pronoun provides a bindable site
for SE . We make the further assumption that, at least in English, PRO is
not allowed in [Spec,DP] if it is headed by the.5 This correctly rules out
                                                
4 The existence of an animate pro can easily be supported with a wide
range of phenomena across various languages, e.g. null objects in Portuguese.
We do not have the space to elabrate on this point. Further questions arise with
respect to a) the range of prepositions allowing this animate pro in their
complement (cf.  John saw a snake near him/*pro), and b) the difference between
an overt and a covert pronominal (John had a coat on pro/him, cf. the table had a
cloth on *pro/it). We leave these matters for further research.
5 This assumption is compatible with the observation that cases of
inherent possession never feature a definite determiner, e.g. *John has the big
nose, *the house has the (beautiful) window . The nature of the definite determiner
in Romance may be different (cf. Vergnaud & Zubizarreta 1992, Tellier 1994).
English does feature this use of the definite determiner in prepositional contexts
of the type I hit John on the nose. We have no insights to offer at this point.
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(14b) with the, but raises the question why (14a) is grammatical with the. It
can't be the DP the window which is satisfying SE 's requirement since the
prevents there being a bindable PRO in [Spec,DP]), so this implies that
there must be another available bindable site. This would be the case if the
structure of (14a) were as in (15):
(15) HAVE [TP [the window]i  T  [PP [AP   ti open]  Pe  proj]]
where proj provides the required pronominal variable, and at the same time
accounts for the animacy effect.
The structure in (15) presents a structural option not yet considered, viz. one
in which the subject of the small clause is not occupied by DP, but by a
clausal constituent, in this instance an AP-small clause. We shall consider
these more complex structures below (section 3.3).
3. Dynamic HAVE
In this section we turn to a use of HAVE which is limited to English, and
which we have dubbed dynamic HAVE, in contradistinction to the HAVE-
structures discussed sofar, which are all stative. Dynamic HAVE structures
occur in a number of types. They all involve non-inherent (contingent)
relationships, and so by hypothesis are to be analyzed as (abstract) TPs.
3.1. Light verb HAVE
Let us start with the simplest case, viz. light verb HAVE-constructions:
(16) a. Mary had a baby
i) but she doesn't anymore (stative)
ii) Mary is having a baby (eventive)
b. Mary had a cup of tea
i) but she used it all up (stative)
ii) Mary is having a cup of tea (eventive)
c. Mary had a shower
i) but now she has a bathtub (stative)
ii) Mary is having a shower (eventive)
These sentences are ambiguous between a stative and a non-stative
(eventive) reading. Under the stative reading, the only one available for their
Dutch and French counterparts,6 they assert that Mary was in the
                                                
6 In the perfect tense, Dutch and French also allow such inchoative
interpretations, as in (i) and (ii).
(i) a. Marie heeft een baby gehad
Marie has a baby had “Mary has delivered a baby”
b. Van wie heb je dat gehad?”
possession of an object, be it a baby, a cup of tea, or a shower. Their
stativity is confirmed by the possibility of continuing these examples with
(i). On the eventive reading, the examples in (16) assert that at some time in
the past, Mary is involved in the activity of “delivering a baby”,
“tea-drinking” and “showering”. Their eventivity is confirmed by their
compatibility with the progressive, as in (ii).
The systematic ambiguity of light verb HAVE between a stative and an
eventive interpretation is also seen from tense-effects. Eventive verbs allow
simple present only in a quantificational environment, e.g. in the presence
of adverbs of quantification such as often and usually. In this respect, light
verb HAVE has the interpretive propertives of an eventive predicate, as
shown in (17a) and (17b). In the absence of a quantificational operator,
canonical eventives are interpreted generically (e.g. Mary sings, Mary
dances), while statives are interpreted as holding at the utterance situation
(e.g. Mary likes chocolate). When light verb HAVE occurs without a
quantifier, it is ambiguous: on the eventive construal, (17c) is akin to Mary
showers, and on the stative construal it is akin to Mary owns a shower.
(17) a. Mary often has a shower in the morning
b. When Mary has a shower, she usually sings
c. Mary has a shower
It is not the tense effects themselves which determine whether a dynamic
meaning is available for HAVE. Rather, it is the possibility of light verb
HAVE being dynamic that yields these tense effects, i.e. the tense effects
follow from the dynamism of the predicate. This makes evident that the
availability of these dynamic readings in English are independent of
potential contributions of the semantics of tense, as it is unlikely that the
adverbs of quantification in (17a/b) would contribute the dynamicity of
HAVE (but cf. note 5). The eventive nature of these dynamic
HAVE-sentences also explains the range of nouns that allow these
structures. An eventive interpretation is available inasmuch as the noun can
be associated with a plausible activity. As an activity, “dollaring” is not
easily conceivable, so that in (2a) John has $5 only has a stative
(possessive) interpretation. But “babying”, “tea-drinking” and “showering”
                                                                                                      
Of whom have you that had “From whom did you get this”
(ii) a. Marie a eu un bébé =(ia)
b. Il a eu un livre de sa mère
He has had a book of his mother
“He has got a book from his mother”
These constructions are qualitatively different from the constructions in English:
they are limited to perfect tense, and are also less restricted with respect to the
choice of object. The inchoative reading derives from the accomplished
interpretation of the participle.
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are more easily construed as activities, hence the possibility of an eventive
interpretation in (16).
We are left with two related questions:
a. What is the structure of eventive light verb constructions?
b. What is the source of their eventiveness/dynamism?
As a first step in providing an answer to these questions, note the dynamic
character of (18):
(18) John had himself a cup of tea
Observe also that even without the overt presence of himself the sentence
has a reflexive interpretation. This reflexivity is obligatory, as evidenced by
the ill-formedness of (19a). In this respect, the have-construction contrasts
with get, which may be, but need not be, reflexive, as shown in (19b).
Consistent with this difference, in the absence of an overt reflexive, the
get-construction is not necessarily reflexive in its interpretation, as in (19c).
(19) a. *John had Mary a cup of tea
b. John got Mary/himself a cup of tea
c. John got a cup of tea
The basic ingredient of our HAVE-analysis is that there must be an
anaphoric link between the subject of HAVE and an A-position contained in
the complement of HAVE. Hence, both (16) and (18) must contain a
bindable site. As a first approximation, the structure of (18) is as in (20):
(20) HAVE (=P+SEi) [TP ___ T [XP [DP a cup of tea] ... proi ... ]]]
Let us run through the arguments for this partial representation. First, the
relationship between John and a cup of tea is not inherent. Hence, the
complement of HAVE must be TP. Second, there must be a pronominal
element to satisfy HAVE’s binding requirement. This element is himself in
(18).7 We assume that himself is generated in the complement of to in the
predicate position internal to XP. From there it is moved to [Spec,TP] in
the manner argued for by den Dikken (1992) for double object constructions.
He argues that this is an instance of locative preposing, i.e. predicate
preposing by which the DP a cup of tea, its subject, receives case. After
movement of to himself to [Spec,TP] to is in a position from where it may
be incorporated into HAVE. At LF, himself is further moved to
[Spec,AGROP]. This gives (21a) as the ultimate underlying structure, with
its derivation (21b):
(21) a. HAVE [TP --- T [PP [DP a cup of tea] to himself]]
                                                
7 Recall that we assume that there are only pronouns, as per Kayne
(1991). Hence,  himself is a pronoun, anaphorized through the addition of the
self-morpheme, cf. Pica (1987). This anaphorization imposes a more local
binding requirement.
b. HAVE+toi [TP [ti himself]j T [PP [DP a cup of tea] tj ]]
We note on the side that given the choice of himself movement of (to)
himself is the only option, as otherwise himself, being anaphoric, is not
locally bound, a cup of tea being a local accessible subject. Alternatively,
had a pronoun (him ) been chosen, such movement would have to be
precluded in order to avoid a principle B violation. The relation between a
pronoun and a reflexive pronoun is thus as that between proi in the
complement position of nose in (9) and PRO in (10).8
Having identified the structure associated with light verb HAVE, we now
consider the source of its eventiveness. We propose that HAVE+to is
responsible for the dynamic nature of HAVE in these examples. The fact
that Dutch and French do not have a dynamic HAVE now reduces to the fact
that there is no candidate preposition which could yield such a dynamic verb
via incorporation. To be sure, the Dutch prepositions te and aan are stative,
not dynamic, as is the French preposition à. This difference is easily
observable: A train to London or This train is to London are directional,
hence dynamic, whereas Un train à Paris or Le train est à Paris have a
stative reading.9 The difference between aan/à and to is also visible in De
                                                
8 Zribi-Hertz (p.c.) points out the existence of non-dynamic to  in the
complement of HAVE, as in (i), which differs in meaning from (ii). 
(i) John had the room to him*(self)/ *Mary
(ii) John had him*(self)/*Mary a room
Does (i), with a ‘stative’ to , underly ‘dynamic’ (ii)? Recall that we follow
Kayne’s assumption that only pronouns exist, with SELF attached as an
indication of local binding. Underlying (ii), then, we would not predict (i), but
rather (iii), parallel to (iv):
(iii) John had a room to him
(iv) John had $5 on him(*self)
The problem with (i), therefore, is why the pronoun is ‘reflexivized’. The natural
assumption is that an invisible local antecedent is present for himself, as in (vi):
(vi) Johni had [SC the room [XP ei ... to himselfi ]]
We are thus led to ask what the nature of XP is. We have as yet no detailed
proposal to make, but the idea would be that the internal complexity of XP
prohibits incorporation of to  in this case. The semantic role of to himself in (i)
is comparable to that of other restrictive predicates, e.g. John has $5 to spend.
9 There is a clearly directional preposition in Dutch, viz. naar, just as
there is vers in French. These prepositions appear to have quite different
properties from the other prepositions mentioned (te/aan and à). It can be shown
that naar in Dutch cannot incorporate into the verb. Firstly, while R-extraction
from the complement of P is normally possible in Dutch, with the further
condition that the stranded P be (almost) adjacent to the verb (cf. (ib)), such R-
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beslissing is aan Jan, La décision est à Jean, where apparently a stative
preposition is used. English must stativize to in this case, by adding up, as
in The decision is *(up) to John.
3.2. Causative HAVE
In addition to the light verb dynamic HAVE discussed in the previous
section, English HAVE has a further dynamic use, which is also absent in
Dutch and French, viz. so-called causative HAVE (cf. Ritter & Rosen
1991), illustrated in (22).
(22) a. John had me dance with Sandy
b. John had Bill kissed by the Mafia
Again applying the logic developed so far, we are led to postulate the
structure in (23):
(23) HAVE [TP .... T [SC [IP ....V...] [P to] pro]]
The reasoning goes as follows:
- Causative HAVE is contingent. By hypothesis, this means that its 
complement is TP.
- The SE  component of HAVE requires the presence of a pronominal 
variable, which must be contained in a prepositional predicate
- The prepositional predicate must be headed by to, the incorporation of 
                                                                                                      
extraction is not possible in the case of naar: it requires that the adverb toe is
added, cf. (iic):
(i) a. Ik ben op het dak geklommen
I am on the roof climbed “I have climbed on the roof”
b. Het dak waar ik op geklommen ben
The roof where I on climbed am
(ii) a. Ik ben naar school gelopen
I am to school walked “I have walked to school”
b. De school waar ik naar *(toe) gelopen ben
The school where I NAAR to walked am
Secondly, while locational prepositions allow for the formation of
“postpositional” constructions, as in (iiib), this is excluded with naar:
(iii) a. dat ik in de tuin wandel b. dat ik de tuin in wandel
that I in the garden walk that I the garden in walk
(iv) a. dat ik naar de winkel wandel b. *dat ik de winkel naar wandel
that I NAAR the shop walk that I the shop NAAR walk
This might be taken to constitute independent evidence for the impossibility to
incorporate this directional preposition. A parallel fact concerning French vers
is that whereas various prepositions in various dialects allow for some form of
stranding (e.g. dedans “inside”, dessus “on top”, as well as J'ai voté pour “I voted
in favor __”), cf. Zribi-Hertz (1984), no such stranding is ever allowed by vers.
which is responsible for the dynamic character of HAVE.
Recall that with light verb HAVE it is possible to express the anaphoric
relation overtly, by means of a reflexive, as in (18) above. But this is not
possible with causative HAVE:
(24)a. *John had+  to  i [TP [ti himself]j T [SC [IP me dance with Sandy] tj]]]
b. *John had+  to  i [TP [ti himself]j T [SC [IPBill kissed by the Mafia] tj]]]
An obvious difference between light verb HAVE and causative HAVE lies
in the nature of the lower Small Clause-subject: in (18), it is a simple DP,
but in (23) it is an IP. This points to a Case-theoretic account of the
contrast. In (18), given the structure in (21), locative preposing of to
himself allows the DP subject of the SC to share its case with to himself
(following den Dikken 1992). However, in (24), the case-needy DP is not
itself the subject of the SC, but rather it is contained in a larger IP.
Therefore, this DP must itself move to [Spec,TP] (and to [Spec,AGROP]) at
LF in order to get Case. If locative preposing were to fill these higher
Spec's, a Case violation would result. (As before, if locative preposing fails
to apply, the reflexive does not have an appropriate antecedent, and the only
licit pronominal is animate pro.)
If this account of the ill-formedness of (24) is correct, this implies that (22)
does not involve to incorporation after movement of to himself/ pro to
[Spec,TP]. But this leaves the following question: given that causative
HAVE is dynamic, and that dynamic HAVE arises via incorporation of to,
how then can to raise to HAVE in order to ensure its dynamicity? We
propose that this is done by successive head-movement of to via T to
HAVE. This leaves [Spec,TP] as a landing site for the DP subject of the IP.
Thus, to-incorporation is licensed in one of two ways: via locative
preposing as in (21) or via successive head movement. The former is
impossible if the subject of the SC is complex, i.e. if the Case needy DP is
contained in a larger constituent.
This reasoning also accounts for why there are no sentences of the type
*John had me dance with Mary nasty, with a structure as in (25):
(25) HAVE [TP --- T [SC [IP DP ....]  AP]]
Predicate preposing is inapplicable in this instance, because the Case-needy
DP is embedded in the subject of SC. This DP must raise to [Spec,TP] at
LF in order to be able to reach the available [Spec,AGROP]. If we assume
that A is not able to move to T, the option of head movement of A is not
available either. The assumption that P may, but A may not move to T is
independently justified by i) the absence of tensed adjectives in English, and
ii) the presence of prepositional elements in T as with infinitives. In this
way, we account for the unavailability of AP-predicates in the complement
of (abstract) T in happenstance constructions when the subject is more
complex than a DP.
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In addition to having bare infinitives as causative complements, we also find
participial complements as in (26):
(26) John had Bill examined
The structure of these constructions is essentially that of (23). If participial
phrases are a kind of IP, the absence of a reflexive (*John had himself Bill
examined) is accounted for in the same way: Bill has to be able to move to
[Spec,TP] to be Case-licensed, and this is incompatible with locative
preposing (which is the ultimate source of the reflexive).
At this point, one might ask how (26) differs from a perfect construction,
such as (27):
(27) John had examined Bill
(27) does not involve dynamic HAVE. Under our assumptions, this means
that there is no to incorporation. (27) does involve a TP-complement, but in
this case, the TP is the participial structure itself. The structure of (27) is as
in (29), while that of (26) is as in (28):
(28) HAVE [TP  ...  T  [SC [TP ...  T -en  [VP pro V Bill]] to pro]]
(29) HAVE [TP  ...  T  -en  [VP pro V Bill]]
In (28), the preposition to incorporates into HAVE, yielding causative
HAVE (i.e. dynamic HAVE with an event denoting complement). The
(covert) pronominal complement of to satisfies the binding requirement
imposed by SE , accounting for the “reflexive beneficiary” interpretation.
The pronominal external argument of V is not bound by SE , but remains
free. The object Bill raises to the inner [Spec,TP], as is usual in passives,
and further raises to the dominating [Spec,TP] at LF in order to be able to
reach [Spec,AGROP]. (The same LF movement was posited in connection
with (25).
The much simpler construction in (29) instantiates a real T, i.e. a past,
which is interpreted as a secondary tense (i.e. Aspect), situating the time of
the event denoted by the VP in the past relative to the temporal anchoring
point of the tense of HAVE (cf. Guéron & Hoekstra 1994). V (or its
participial form) raises to T. The binding requirement imposed by SE  is
now satisfied through the external argument pro. As in the case of inherent
possession (cf. (10)), the argument pronominal bound by SE  is moved to
the position of [Spec,TP], i.e. to a PRO-compatible position. The object
Bill is moved to the matrix [Spec,AGROP], to satisfy the case provided by
HAVE. This movement is postponed until LF.
Consistent with our analysis, the interpretations of the structures in (28)-
(29) are distinct. (28) has a causative interpretation, with the external
argument not bound by SE  (and hence not bound by the matrix subject).
SE 's binding requirement is satisfied via the pro in the complement of the P
head to, which is itself incorporated into HAVE. (29), on the other hand, is
a simple control structure: the external argument of the embedded verb is
bound by SE , and hence bound by the matrix subject.
3.3. Experiential HAVE
In this section we turn to the experiential HAVE-construction:
(30) John had a bee sting him on the nose
We analyze it as an instance of non-dynamic HAVE with a TP complement,
an instance of complex happenstance constructions. In these experiential
constructions the binding requirement of SE  is satisfied overtly by the
pronominal element, him  in this example. Belvin (1993) notes that these
experiential constructions are subject to an internal anaphorization
requirement in the same way as other cases of contingent possession. The
presence of this internal anaphoric link, forced by our analysis of HAVE,
obviates the need to appeal to any other site for a pronominal variable. The
structure of such examples is therefore (31):
(31) Johni HAVE [TP ...  T  [VP a bee sting himi on the nose]]
with movement of sting to T and a bee to [Spec,TP]. That experiential
HAVE-constructions favor animate subjects reduces to the fact that animates
are able of experiencing events as Belvin (1993) notes. Although
experiential HAVE prefers animate subjects with eventive (verbal)
predicates, inanimate subjects are not totally excluded, as evidenced by
examples such as This castle had many visitors pass through its doors. With
non-verbal happenstances (John's house always has its door open, The table
has a lamp on it), animates and inanimates are alike in the option of being
in a certain state.
A further observation provides a strong corroboration of some of the
assumptions we have made. None of the happenstance structures allow for
an overt reflexive subject of the clausal complement. This is illustrated in
(32). There is one exception to this general rule, viz. the structure in (32d).
(32) a. *John had himself sick
b. *John had himself in the hospital
c. *John had himself sit on a bee's nest
d. John had only himself to look after
The problem is similar to that posed by with-absolutes, which exhibit the
same restriction against reflexive subjects with the same exception:
(33) a. *with (only) himself ill, John ...
b. *with (only) himself in the hospital, John ....
c. with only himself to look after, John ...
The limitation of himself in with-constructions to these infinitival
predicates suggests a possible venue for the explanation. The infinitival
predicate itself contains a gap, bound by an empty operator, which is in turn
strongly bound by himself. The relevant structure is given in (34):
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(34) [with [SC [only himself]i [CP Oi [IP PROi to look after ti ]]], Johni ...
Suppose that these binding relations establish a (derived) chain, and that the
binding requirement on himself may be satisfied within this chain, e.g. in
the manner of reconstruction or a copy-analysis (cf. Chomsky 1993). For
our purposes, we may take only  himself to also be present at the position of
ti, as a full copy which is not spelled out at PF, and that licensing of
himself may be satisfied from this position. This licensing involves as per
Chomsky (1992), SELF movement to INFL, as well as a suitable binder in
the Spec of INFL. These requirements are met in the structure in (34), where
INFL is present and PRO serves as a local binder.
In other contexts, a himself subject of the with-construction cannot be
licensed under these assumptions: SELF movement must be to INFL, the
only INFL available is external to the with- phrase. As with- phrases are
adjuncts and hence islands for movement, SELF movement is blocked, and
the reflexive is therefore illicit.
(35) *[ with [SC [(only) himself]  [AP/VP  ... ]
This approach carries over to our happenstance structures in (32). By
hypothesis, happenstance structures are TPs. The structure of (32) is as in
(36):
(36) John  HAVE [TP     T  [SC  himself  X]]
This T (INFL) provides the local attachment site for SELF-movement, thus
preventing SELF from moving any further.10 This then accounts for the
island effect, parallel to the islandhood of with-constructions. A further
condition on the licitness of SELF is the presence of a suitable binder in the
local Spec. This condition is not fulfilled in the happenstance structures:
[Spec,TP] serves as an intermediate landing site for the residu of himself on
its way to [Spec,AGROP] at LF. Only (32d) is allowed, as here again
reconstruction into the infinitival structure is possible as discussed.
Complements to causative HAVE do permit a reflexive, as shown in (37).
(37) John had himself dance with Mary
There is however a notable difference in the derivation of these structures.
Compare (36) with (23), repeated here as (38), now with himself as the
subject of IP:
                                                
10 There is a potential problem with this account: we might expect that
himself moves in its entirety to [Spec,AGROP], and that SELF-movement
proceeds from the derived position, moving SELF to the matrix T, where a
suitable antecedent is available. This would yield a grammatical outcome of these
constructions. SELF-movement is restricted to the embedded T. Movement of
himself, with subsequent SELF-movement, brings an anaphor outside of its local
binding domain. The local binding domain is the embedded TP since TP contains
an attachment site for SELF as well as an accessible SUBJECT.
(38) HAVE [TP .... T [SC [IP himself ....V...] [P to pro]]]
In (38), SELF-movement will attach self to T. How is the local antecedent
requirement satisfied in this structure? Recall that we argued that to
undergoes successive head-movement, resulting in the dynamicity of HAVE.
If the complement of to, which functions as the pronominal variable
required by HAVE, moves to [Spec,TP], then it will have the status of
PRO. The derived structure then is as in (39). PRO serves as the local
antecedent of SELF.
(39) HAVE+toi [TP PROj  T+selfk  [SC [IP  [him tk] ..V...] ti  tj ]]]
One might ask whether the presence of PRO in [Spec,TP] does not threaten
the Case-licensing of him  (the residue of SELF-movement) in (39). As in
the case of (24), the Case needy DP is not a subject of the SC, but
embedded in its subject. The crucial difference is that while (24) involves
XP preposing, (39) involves head movement of to. This head movement of
to makes [Spec,TP] and the next higher Spec equidistant (Chomsky 1993),
allowing him  to skip the occupied [Spec,TP].
The reflexive following HAVE in (18) is unproblematic: the DP a cup of
tea receives Case in the manner discussed above, viz. locative inversion.
himself is sitting in [Spec,TP], and hence the matrix T is the first available
attachment site for SELF-movement.
4. Conclusion
Our analysis of a large number of HAVE-constructions is based on very few
assumptions. Apart from the general assumptions of the minimalist
program, we have argued that many of HAVE's properties can find a ready
explanation if the hypothesis of SE  is adopted.
It is the presence of a SE-component which induces a binding relation
between the subject of HAVE and a position contained within the
complement of HAVE:
(40) NPi  P+SEi [XP  proi ]
The anaphorizing effects all follow from this single hypothesis. It led us to
postulate an animate pro, for which independent motivation is available.
The second assumption we made is that inherent and contingent possession
are represented by distinct categories. Inherent possession correlates with a
DP complement, headed by a relational noun which provides an experiencer
argument that is ultimately licensed as a PRO in [Spec,DP]:
(41) NPi  P+SEi [DP  PROi ... ]
Contingent possession correlates with a Small Clause complement with a
null Tense position. At this point, it is appropriate to present a synopsis of
the possibilities. If the Small Clause is headed by the (covert) P of central
coincidence, this yields an “external possessor” construction (John has $5)
which is restricted to animate subjects. The animacy restriction follows
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from the presence of animate pro, complement to Pe:
(42) NPi  P+SEi [TP  [T [SC DP [PP Pe pro ]]]
Happenstance HAVE is associated with essentially the same structure,except
the Small Clause (usually) contains an overt pronominal: (43a) John had a
bee sting him on the nose, (43b) The house has its windows open, and (43c)
The table has a lamp on it.
(43) a. NPi  P+SEi [TP [T [SC   [VP  ]]]
b. NPi  P+SEi [TP [T [SC   [AP  ]]]
c. NPi  P+SEi [TP [T [SC   [PP  ]]]
The postulation of animate pro also captures the subtle contrasts in (14) that
occur with happenstance HAVE, and which we analyze as instances where
the prepositional Small Clause has in its subject/specifier position
something other than a DP, as in (44). This corresponds to examples like
John has the window open, possible only with animate subjects.
(44) NPi  P+SEi [TP  [T [SC AP [PP Pe pro ]]]
Yet another environment where pro satisfies the binding requirement
imposed by the SE-component of HAVE is in the perfective, where the
subject of the embedded VP is pro (e.g. John had examined Bill):
(45) HAVE [TP  ...  T  -en  [VP pro V Bill ]]
Taken together, (42), (43), (44) and (45) constitute non-augmented HAVE.
We furthermore presented an account of the differences in the use of HAVE
between English on the one hand and Dutch and French on the other. The
essential ingredient is the availability of a dynamic preposition in English,
whose incorporation into HAVE yields augmented HAVE. To-incorporation
arises either through locative preposing of the dative predicate, or through
cyclic head-movement of to, each correlated with distinct syntactic effects.
Locative preposing yields (eventive) light verb HAVE, whose bindable site
may be a covert animate pro (46a), e.g. John had a cup of tea, or an overt
reflexive (46b), e.g. John had himself a cup of tea.
(46) a. NPi  P+SEi [TP  [T [SC DP [PP to proi ]]]
b. NPi  P+SEi [TP  [T [SC DP [PP to himselfi ]]]
Finally, causative HAVE arises when the specifier/subject of the Small
Clause headed by to is an IP (rather than a DP), as in (47). This accounts for
not only bare-infinitive complements (John had me dance with Sandy), but
also for participial complements (John had Bill examined).
(47) NPi  P+SEi [TP  [T [SC IP [PP to proi ]]]
There is one use of HAVE which we have not considered in this paper, viz.
the modal HAVE-construction. It occurs in all three languages, which
suggests that it instantiates non-augmented HAVE:
(48) a. John has to do that
b. Jan heeft dat te doen
c. Jean a à faire cela
We shall not try to provide an account of this construction, but want to
raise the hypothesis that HAVE in this case is complemented by a CP,
which makes its status rather distinct from the instances which constitute
the focus of our paper.
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